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The Attorney as Defendant
By JAcK LEAr*
.... thousands of young men in the United States annually find their
way to the bar, who are poorly qualified for its duties and responsi-
bilities, and who, without the aid of the 'cramming' law school, would
have possessed neither the patience nor the force of character to have
prepared themselves for their bar examinations."'
BY CUSTOM and inclination, the lawyer is an officer of the court
who becomes a momentary partisan for the sake of justice and a suc-
cessful career. At times, however, events force him into an unaccus-
tomed role, that of an interested party whose competence or integrity
has been attacked in a law suit. His adversary, for the most part, is a
former client, no longer satisfied with their previous relation of trust
and confidence. During the past century, for example, members of
the California bar have had to defend their professional reputations-
sometimes successfully, sometimes not-against charges of negligence,
breach of a fiduciary duty, fraud, undue influence, misuse of money,
breach of contract, and the like.
2
In dealing with this body of litigation, courts have established a
simple framework by which to measure an attorney's conduct: he must
act fairly, sensibly, and efficiently to uphold the honor of his profession
while he pursues its rewards for private gain. Most lawyers satisfy
these requirements. Those who fail, deliberately or inadvertently,
become casebook examples of the disarray into which an attorney-
client relationship can fall through unsatisfactory management. This
article discusses the various ways in which attorneys have been breed-
ing their own lawsuits, and examines how neat principles of jurispru-
dence are applied to the complex facts of professional legal practice.3
* B.A., 1951, Brooklyn College; LL.B., 1957, M.A., 1958, University of Illinois.
Member, Illinois and California Bars.
I SToNE, LAw ANm ITS A mINISTRATION 174 (1924). Harlan F. Stone was Attorney
General of the United States when he made this observation. In 1925 he became an As-
sociate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and in 1941, its Chief Justice.
- The attorney often appeared as plaintiff in these cases, but the questions about his
activities remained the same whether he was plaintiff or defendant. May we also note
that disciplinary proceedings instituted by the State Bar are cited here only if they bear
directly on an attorney-client dispute.
3 Although this issue of the HAsm rcs LAw JoURNAL, is primarily devoted to a dis-
cussion of torts, the present article cuts across the boundaries that traditionally divided
different causes of action and includes within its scope all civil actions involving attor-
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Fraud; Undue Influence; Breach of a Fiduciary Duty
Prescribed Standards of Trust and Confidence
When an attorney at law deals with a client, he is bound to uber-
rima fides, superabounding faith. His own desires can never be brought
in collision with the interests of the client. His role must be that of a
representative acting for the principal, and neither a rival nor a com-
petitor acting for himself. He must never take advantage of his posi-
tion to speculate on the interests entrusted to him.4
An attorney at law should be a paragon of candor, fairness, honor,
and fidelity in all his dealings with those who place their trust in his
ability and integrity, and he will at all times and under all circum-
stances be held to the full measure of what he ought to be.5
To make certain these standards are kept, courts interpret the fidu-
ciary relationship of attorney and client as placing the burden of
greater integrity on the attorney. Although an attorney is permitted
to have business dealings with his client, courts scrutinize these trans-
actions with jealous care, especially when the negotiations relate to
the very reason the attorney was hired. The client can set aside these
transactions with ease unless the attorney shows by extrinsic evidence
that the client acted in full knowledge of all relevant facts and under-
stood their effect. As stated in the English rule laid down by Lord
Eldon, the attorney must have given his client all reasonable advice
against himself that he would have given against a third person.6
Litigation against an attorney for failing to meet these require-
ments arises under the general headings of fraud, undue influence,
and breach of a fiduciary duty. Each category shades into the other,
neys. If justification is needed, it may be noted that even contract actions against at-
torneys are often founded in tort, e.g., fraud, money had and received, negligence, etc.
4 Valentine v. Stewart, 15 Cal. 387 (1860). See also Cox v. Delmas, 99 Cal. 104,
33 P. 836 (1893).
5 Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 P. 560 (1906). See also In re Boone,
83 F. 944 (N.D. Cal. 1897). When an attorney is guilty of conduct that stamps him as
being unfit to remain a member of his profession, he should be disbarred. The acts
complained of need not subject him to criminal indictment or civil liability, but must
show unfitness for the confidence and trust required in the attorney-client relationship
and in practice before the court. If he displays such a lack of personal honesty or good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, these considerations are
good grounds for his disbarment (although not every moral delinquency justifies such
action).
6 Felton v. LeBreton, 92 Cal. 457, 28 Pac. 490 (1891). See also CAL. Crv. CoDE
§ 2235, which has been consistently applied to the attorney-client relationship: "All
transactions between a trustee and his beneficiary during the existence of the trust, or
while the influence acquired by the trust remains, by which he obtains any advantage
from his beneficiary, are presumed to be entered into by the latter without sufficient
consideration, and under undue influence."
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either when the client asserts more than one theory for his action or
when he states his grievances without specifically categorizing them.
Proof of these matters, however, remains essentially the same, with
one chief difference based on the manner in which the attorney carried
out his objectionable -activities. In some cases, the attorney has al-
legedly taken direct advantage of the client through face-to-face deal-
ings; in other instances, the attorney has dealt with a third person on
the basis of knowledge acquired from the client, allegedly to the cli-
ent's detriment. Face-to-face dealings are likely to be attacked as
stemming from undue influence; indirect advantage through a third
party, as breach of a fiduciary duty; and either fact situation, as fraud.
From a procedural viewpoint, if an attorney is suing a client, the
attorney makes out a prima facie case in his behalf when he shows
execution of the agreement in question. To avoid the effect of this
apparently valid agreement, the client must then establish that the
fiduciary relationship of attorney and client existed at the time the
transaction was made. By doing so, the client raises the rebuttable
presumption of the agreement's invalidity. The attorney finally has
the burden of showing that the agreement was fair and equitable and
that he received no advantage from its execution. After this evidence
is evaluated, one party receives a judgment that ordinarily is not dis-
turbed on appeal since resolution of the facts is the function of the
trial court.7 These controversies are generally based on conflicting
evidence about the facts existing at the time of the disputed trans-
action. The attorney usually testifies that he made full disclosure and
was fair in all respects. The client usually denies receiving the infor-
mation that the attorney had to reveal in fulfilling his fiduciary obliga-
tions. Since most attorney-client conferences are held in private or,
perhaps, with the attendance of the attorney's employees or the client's
relatives, both sides can ordinarily present no more compelling evi-
dence about these meetings than the personal testimony of interested
parties. Juries are left with much to decide and more to confuse them.
Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship
Before a client can raise the presumption of undue influence and
insufficient consideration in the making of a compensation agreement
with an attorney, he must establish that a confidential relationship
existed and that the fiduciary used his position to gain an advantage.8
While the attorney must prove that the transaction was fair, that he
made a reasonable use of the confidence placed in him, and that he
7See Moore v. Hoar, 27 Cal. App. 2d 269, 81 P.2d 226 (1938).
8Bradner v. Vasquez, 43 Cal. 2d 147, 272 P.2d 11 (1954). See also Foster v.
Abrahams, 74 Cal. App. 521, 241 Pac. 274 (1925).
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gave honest advice about himself to the client, these principles apply
only after the client has reposed confidence in the attorney and is pro-
ceeding under this influence. 9 The presumption has no bearing on a
transaction in which the attorney openly assumes a hostile attitude
towards the client, nor does it apply to the contract that originally
created the relationship and fixed the attorney's compensation. Until
the initial contract is made, the confidential relation does not exist and
the parties deal at arm's length in agreeing on its terms.'0
No particular contract is necessary to create the protected associa-
tion. It is the fact of the relationship that gives rise to its rights and
obligations, and not the formal or informal nature of the agreement."
If there is a conflict in evidence about the existence of the relationship,
the trier of fact must determine the factual basis for the opposing
contentions. Otherwise, when no such conflict appears, the determina-
tion is a question of law. 12
The client can meet his burden by proving that the attorney's pro-
fessional dealings with him had been of a continuous nature for some
time before the disputed agreement was made; that the attorney had
filed an answer for him in a lawsuit; that the attorney had performed
other legal services in his behalf; and that the disputed agreement
was intimately connected with the very business for which the relation
existed. Even though the attorney did not try to "make money" from
his client, the client was entitled to believe that he was under the
attorney's care and that the attorney could charge for his services if
he so desired.
13
An attorney can show that the fiduciary relationship did not exist
before the making of a particular employment contract when he proves
that, despite his having been the client's attorney at an earlier time, he
had given her a final accounting and had turned over his files at the
end of that matter. Regardless of the fact that he had been in touch
with her since their first association and had recommended a lawyer
to her on another problem, he is not necessarily in a confidential rela-
tion when he prepares a contract for his new services.
14
The attorney does enter into a fiduciary relationship, however,
when he takes over the defense of a personal injury action as the rep-
resentative of an insurance company. In that event, by making an
9 Boardman v. Crittenden, 52 Cal. App. 438, 198 Pac. 1020 (1921).
10 Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 156 Cal. 510, 105 Pac. 981 (1909).
11 Brydonjack v. Rieck, 5 Cal. App. 2d 219, 42 P.2d 336 (1935).
12 Ferrara v. LaSala, 186 Cal. App. 2d 277, 9 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960).
13 Id.
1 Calvert v. Stoner, 33 Cal. 2d 97, 199 P.2d 297 (1948). See also Porter v. Peck-
ham, 44 Cal. 204 (1872).
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insured defendant his client, he has no legal right to stipulate away
the insured's interests for the benefit of his other client, the insurance
company.
15
"Advantage" to the Attorney
The rebuttable presumption of undue influence arises whenever
an attorney gains an advantage from an agreement with his client
during the attorney-client relationship. "Advantage" occurs if the at-
torney's position is improved, if he obtains a favorable opportunity, or
if he otherwise gains, benefits, or profits from his fiduciary position. To
raise this presumption, the client need only show that an advantage
appeared, and not that it was unfair, unjust, or inequitable."' The at-
torney must then try to overcome the presumption with proof that the
transaction was fair and equitable, and that the client was well-enough
informed to deal with him at arm's length.
17
What is nearly always discussed in these cases are two primary
facts: the relative positions of the attorney and the client before and
after the disputed agreement; and the client's ability to make an intel-
ligent bargain, judged according to his mental, physical, and psycho-
logical condition, as well as on the amount of necessary information
the attorney had given him. Acting on these basic considerations, which
can be appreciated more clearly by example than by generalization,
courts have found advantage in the following situations:
The attorney had an official and financial interest in a business in
which he urged his client to invest on the promise of "big returns." 18
15 Ivy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1958).
10 Bradner v. Vasquez, 43 Cal. 2d 147, 272 P.2d. 11 (1954); Rader v. Thrasher, 193
Cal. App. 2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1961); Ferrara v. LaSala, 186 Cal. App. 2d 277,
9 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960). See also Silver v. Shemanski, 89 Cal. App. 2d 520, 550,
201 P.2d 418, 437 (1949); Estate of Mallory, 99 Cal. App. 96, 278 Pac. 488 (1929).
In Bradner v. Vasquez, supra, a dissenting judge noted, "The meaning of 'advan-
tage' as applied to the act of one who is both historically and technically a trustee may
well be different in scope or at least as to occasions of application from its proper mean-
ing when applied to a lawyer practicing his profession." 43 Cal. 2d 147, 155, 272 P.2d
11, 16.
1
7 In re Witt's Estate, 198 Cal. 407, 245 Pac. 197 (1926); Bold v. Velkov, 133 Cal.
App. 2d 622, 284 P.2d 890 (1955); Roberts v. Wachter, 104 Cal. App. 2d 271, 231 P.2d
534 (1951); Kisling v. Shaw, 33 Cal. 425, 91 Am. Dec. 644 (1867) (which states that
the element of damage to the client is an important consideration); McKinnon v. Cook
& Zambriskie, 2 Lab. 37 (1857).
I8 Zeller v. Knapp, 115 Cal. App. 486, 1 P.2d 1071 (1931). In presenting her evi-
dence, the client testified: "I said, 'Mr. Knapp, of course, I want a safe investment. I
don't know anything about these investments. I don't know a thing about them.' He
said, 'Well, that is just why I want to look after your money and you do not need to
worry about anything of the sort because you know an attorney does not make mis-
takes."' 115 Cal. App. 486, 488, 1 P.2d 1071, 1072.
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The client (an emaciated woman subject to hemorrhages, of ec-
centric mind, and interested in astrology and fortune telling) named
her attorney as the sole beneficiary in her will, after an earlier agree-
ment that she would leave him one-half of her property in return for
his providing her with the necessities of life. 19
The attorney induced his client to enter into a business transaction
about which he concealed material facts and to which the client would
not have consented if she knew his real interest in the transaction-
even though she did not suffer a substantial financial loss.
20
The attorney had his client exchange an unsecured 10,000 dollar
note given to pay legal fees for a secured 10,000 dollar note, jacked
by property worth 50,000 dollars.
21
The attorney and client originally agreed that the attorney's fee
would be measured at two-tenths of the client's share in certain prop-
erty, and the attorney later obtained an assignment of tluee-tenths.
22
The attorney and client originally agreed that the attorney could
be discharged "with or without cause," and the attorney obtained a
later contract that he could be discharged only for "legal cause."23
The client, a widow dying of cancer and under the influence of
opiates, changed an original document that made the attorney her
agent in selling shares to a later document that gave the attorney half
the proceeds of the sale.24
The client needed capital to carry on his activities in a corporation,
and the attorney prevailed on him to part with his control of the under-
taking, to the attorney's benefit25
The attorney advised his client it would be best to fix his fee be-
tween themselves rather than let the probate court do so, accepted
19 In re Witt's Estate, 198 Cal. 407, 245 Pac. 197 (1926). See Priester v. Citizens
National Trust and Savings Bank, 131 Cal. App. 2d 314, 280 P.2d 835 (1955), in which
a blind and extremely nervous client transferred nearly all his assets to his attorney as
security for a "fair" attorney's fee. In re Corbett's Estate, 123 Cal. App. 2d 465, 266
P.2d 935 (1954), in which a 67 year old widow, who was a sherry addict with poor
judgment and varying lucidity, bequeathed nearly all her estate to her attorney and his
wife. In re Johnson's Estate, 85 Cal. App. 2d 760, 193 P.2d 782 (1948), in which an
83 year old widow, of weak mentality, personally unkempt, and inclined to rambling
conversation, named her attorney as residuary legatee.
20 In re Soale, 31 Cal. App. 144, 159 Pac. 1065 (1916) (a disbarment proceeding).
21 Magee v. Brenneman, 188 Cal. 562, 206 Pac. 37 (1922). See Metropolis Trust
& Savings Bank v. Monier, 169 Cal. 592, 147 P. 265 (1915), which required an attorney
to offer affirmative proof of the facts surrounding an advantageous transaction in which
he received a secured note for $20,000 from his client.
22 Bonifacio v. Stuart, 52 Cal. App. 487, 199 Pac. 69 (1921).
23Bradner v. Vasquez, 43 Cal. 2d 147, 272 P.2d 11 (1954). See also Cooley v.
Miller & Lux, 168 Cal. 120, 142 Pac. 83 (1914).
241n re Hamaker's Estate, 114 Cal. App. 2d 533, 250 P.2d 637 (1952).
25Plxweve Aircraft Co. v. Greenwood, 61 Cal. App. 2d 21, 141 P.2d 933 (1943).
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her note for 2,000 dollars, and never told her that probating the estate
was a simple matter and the court-ordered fee would have been only
361 dollars, thirty-seven cents.
26
The Need for Independent Advice
One important gauge of fair dealing between an attorney and his
client is the availability of independent advice to guide the client.
"Independent advice is not indispensable,"27 but is a factor in the
court's search for undue influence. 2 There is no absolute need for a
client to seek independent advice if he had the opportunity to do so,
was not prevented from doing so, fully understood what he was doing,
and disposed of property as his own voluntary act.2 9 The more advis-
able procedure, however, requires an independent and disinterested
attorney to be called in to complete the transaction. 30
Even if the attorney suggested that his client obtain independent
advice, but did not "insist" that she do so, he may be found guilty of
using undue influence to have himself named as her residuary legatee.31
The presence of another lawyer (e.g., the client's long-time family
friend who appears as a "friend" and not as a 'lawyer") may also
prove insufficient to rebut the presumpfion of undue influence. This
is true despite the fact that the 'lawyer-friend" tells the client he is
giving the attorney more than he should for the transaction, and the
client insists on going ahead because the attorney would not accept
the case on any other basis.
32
Where there is an amplified fiduciary relationship (e.g., the dual
relationships of attorney-client and older brother-younger sister), it
can become the attorney's "definite duty" to insist that the client obtain
26 Lady v. Worthingham, 57 Cal. App. 557, 135 P.2d 205 (1943). See also Denton
v. Smith, 101 Cal. App. 2d 841, 226 P.2d 723 (1951); Shahabian v. Najarian, 14 Cal.
App. 2d 435, 58 P.2d 396 (1936).
27Kirsch v. Huber, 264 F.2d 387, 395 (9th Cir. 1959).
28 See Bradner v. Vasquez, 43 Cal. 2d 147, 272 P.2d 11 (1954); Ferrara v. LaSala,
186 Cal. App. 2d 277, 9 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960); Denton v. Smith, 101 Cal. App. 2d 841,
226 P.2d 723 (1951); Munfrey v. Cleary, 75 Cal. App. 2d 779, 171 P.2d 750 (1946).
29 See President, etc. of Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 F. 480 (N.D. Cal. 1896).
30 See In re Phillipi's Estate, 76 Cal. App. 2d 100, 172 P.2d 377 (1946).
31 In re Corbett's Estate, 123 Cal. App. 2d 465, 468, 470, 266 P.2d 935, 936, 938
(1954). The court noted: "He did suggest that she get another attorney to prepare the
will, but she stated that he was her attorney and she wanted him to do it." Then the
court catalogued the attorney's faults as including "his failure to insist that she obtain
independent advice .. "
32 Priester v. Citizens Nat. Trust & Savings Bank, 131 Cal. App. 2d 314, 280 P.2d
835 (1955).
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independent legal counsel before making a permanent disposition of
her property.
3 3
But independent legal advice is unnecessary when the attorney
repudiates his relationship to the client, deals with him at arm's length
in an openly and vigorously hostile attitude, and is neither trusted nor
relied on by the client. 
4
The "Unfair" Agreement
To the question, "Can a written instrument be contradicted by a
man, who simply says that he did not know what he was signing-that
he did not read it?" the answer is, "Most certainly when a fiduciary
relation has been shown to exist."3 5 If an attorney tries to enforce an
advantageous contract, he must show that the agreement was fair and
that the client was fully advised of his rights and liabilities. The attor-
ney may claim, "The agreement speaks for itself. It is not my job to
interpret this contract." Unfortunately for his attitude, the law requires
him to make it manifest that he gave his client all reasonable advice
that would have been due to a third person.3
6
When he takes his client's savings, promising to invest her money
safely and return it with interest within three to five years, the attorney
can assume the duties of an involuntary trustee and become liable for
her loss from his activities. Evidence of his responsibility is shown by
the facts which include a statement that, "I am your lawyer, why not
trust me, I am a lawyer, I would not do anything that is wrong."37T When
he places a pen in his client's hand, guides the hand, and has the client
sign a document appointing him as the client's general agent, all during
a time the client is hospitalized in a dull stupor, he commits fraudulent
and unlawful acts that entitle the client's administrator to recover the
property so obtained.38 When he persuades his client to deed property
3 Tidwell v. Richman, 127 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1953), modified on other
grounds Richman v. Tidwell, 234 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1956). The attorney-brother at-
tempted to justify his gaining complete control over his sister's property by stating that
he was afraid of fortune hunters pursuing the sister. Disposing of this argument, the
court observed, "Although making no claim to being a woman of grea tphysical beauty
Mrs. Tidwell is nonetheless a person of considerable personal charm and attraction. It
would be expected that if she were without estate, she would still be appealing as a
prospect for matrimony." 127 F. Supp. at 528.
34 Boardman v. Crittenden, 52 Cal. App. 438, 198 Pac. 1020 (1921).
35 Bonifacio v. Stuart, 52 Cal. App. 487, 490, 491, 199 Pac. 69, 70, 71 (1921).
36 Ferrara v. LaSala, 186 Cal. App. 2d 277, 286, 9 Cal. Rptr. 179, 186 (1960).
37 Kornbau v. Evans, 66 Cal. App. 2d 677, 680, 152 P.2d 651, 653 (1944).
3SMcDonald v. Hewlett, 102 Cal. App. 2d 680, 228 P.2d 83 (1951); companion
case: In re Kromrey's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 639, 220 P.2d 805 (1950). "All the per-
fumes of Araby could not impart a pleasing odor to such a trah'saction." 98 Cal. App.
2d 639, 646, 220 P.2d 805, 810.
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to him as a means of defrauding the client's judgment creditors, the
client can have the deed annulled and a foreclosure set aside on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud.3 9
Even without the existence of a fiduciary duty, a client can quiet
title to real property conveyed to an attorney by showing that the
attorney exerted "moral, social or domestic force" which controlled the
client's "free action." This is especially true if the client is susceptible
because of "mental weakness, old age, ignorance, necessitous condition,
and the like."40
A strong presumption of undue influence arises when a confidential
relationship is coupled with activity on the attorney's part in framing
the disputed transaction. So, for example, an attorney who is named
as sole beneficiary in his client's will can lose his rights on evidence
that he prepared the will in his own office, discussed the document
with the testatrix before she signed it, and had two of his employees
act as witnesses. 41 "Mere negative conduct" towards a client may also
result in a finding that the attorney benefited as a result of unfair deal-
ing. By failing to give the client all the information a disinterested
legal advisor would have given, the attorney fails in his duty, regard-
less of the fact that he neither asks the client to transfer property to
him nor makes any false representations. The value of his services is
not increased, so as to indicate fairness in the transaction, because he
shows the client made repeated visits to his office when she had no
one else to talk to. It is "out of harmony with professional ethics" to
charge a fee for these social calls.
42
39 Sontag v. Denio, 23 Cal. App. 2d 319, 73 P.2d 248 (1937). If the client relies
on the attorney's advice, she is less culpable than he is and is not in pari delicto with
him. See also Clark v. Millsap, 197 Cal. 765, 242 Pac. 918 (1926). Cf. Green v.
MacAdam, 175 Cal. App. 2d 481, 346 P.2d 474 (1959).
40 Espinosa v. Stuart, 52 Cal. App. 477, 481, 199 Pac. 66, 68 (1921).
41 In re Witt's Estate, 198 Cal. 407, 245 Pac. 197 (1926).
42 Thornley v. Jones, 96 Cal. App. 219, 274 Pac. 93 (1929). The client, about 80
years old, was "of a trusting and confiding disposition," in failing health, and with im-
paired senses. For other cases (including disbarment proceedings) that involve unfair
dealings with a client, see In re Barry Yao Co., 172 F.Supp. 375 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (a
bankruptcy proceeding in which the attorney misrepresented the value and extent of his
services); Lucas v. Sweet, 47 Cal. 2d 20, 300 P.2d 828 (1956) (an action in which the
attorney, as bolder of a note and default judgment against the client, failed to notify the
client about a sheriff's sale of the client's property); Clark v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 2d 161,
246 P.2d 1 (1952) (a disbarment proceeding in which the attorney, as a guardian, was
grossly negligent and presented a misleading account to the court); People v. Stanford,
16 Cal. 2d 247, 105 P.2d 969 (1940) (a disbarment proceeding in which the attorney
was found guilty of grand theft from a client); In re Danford, 157 Cal. 425, 108 Pac.
322 (1910) (a disbarment proceeding in which the attorney misrepresented the kind of
services he could perform for his client).
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The "Fair" Agreement
An attorney is not under an actual incapacity to deal with or pur-
chase from his client. In transactions that bear on the confidential
relationship, all the attorney must show is that there has been no
violation of confidence and no advantage taken.43 Although courts
view attorney-client transactions with suspicion and utmost scrutiny,
the attorney can satisfy a court of the agreement's fairness by proving
that it was based on honesty and good faith and that the client freely
entered into the transaction.44 If a client fully understands the nature
of an agreement about attorney's fees, and there is no misrepresenta-
tion, concealment, fraud, or abuse to disturb the confidential relation-
ship, the attorney is entitled to his agreed-on fee.45 The fact, if it is
a fact, that the attorney over-reached the client in other transactions
does not subject the compensation agreement to any infirmity.46 In
dealing with a client who is an experienced businessman, the attorney
need not describe "item by item, the legal meaning of each provision
in the contract" between the client and a third person, despite the at-
torney's receiving benefits from the contract.
47
43 McCormick v. Settle, 70 Cal. App. 351, 233 Pac. 350 (1925). For related cases,
see Stieglitz v. Settle, 175 Cal. 131, 165 Pac. 436 (1917); Stieglitz v. Settle, 50 Cal.
App. 581, 195 Pac. 705 (1921). An attorney for *a seller may properly receive money
from the purchaser of the land, after the sale, if: the money had nothing to do with the
purchase price or sale of the land; there was no previous agreement for payment of the
money; in helping to complete the sale under a commission agreement with the client-
seller, the attorney never solicited or expected any sum from the transaction other than
the agreed-on commission; and the purchaser "voluntarily and on his own initiative" gave
the money to the seller's business agent, who divided it with the attorney. On these
facts, the attorney is entitled to his commission from the seller.
44 United States Oil & Land Co. v. Bell, 153 Cal. 781, 96 Pac. 901 (1908). Cf.
Huston v. Schohr, 63 Cal. App. 2d 267, 275, 146 P.2d 730, 733 (1944): "We do not
believe that either reason or authority requires that when a court instructs a jury that
in all dealings between attorney and client the highest degree of fairness and good faith
is required of the attorneys in dealing with their client in securing the document, it is
also necessary to go further and advise the jury that the courts view such transactions
with suspicion."
4' Lombardi v. Kallock, 34 Cal. App. 698, 168 Pac. 698 (1917). See also Cline v.
Zappettini, 131 Cal. App. 2d 723, 281 P.2d 35 (1955) (in which the client was an expe-
rienced, successful businessman who could act understandingly with the attorney);
McNeal v. Foreman, 117 Cal. App. 155, 3 P.2d 583 (1931).
- Combs v. Hughes, 160 Cal. App. 2d 809, 326 P.2d 1 (1958) (in which the attor-
ney established that he fully performed the terms of his contract and that his fees were
reasonable). See also Bailey v. Security Trust Co., 179 Cal. 540, 815, 177 Pac. 444, 449
(1919) in which the attorney was permitted to retain a stock option obtained from the
client at a price the attorney represented the stock to be worth (even though this repre-
sented value was less than adequate), where there was no showing of "unfaith" or
"unfairness."
4 Kirsch v. Huber, 264 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1959).
(Vol. 13
Undue influence can be rebutted even where the client is over
seventy-six years old and physically weak, suffers from neuralgia and
the feebleness natural to age, has pains in her head, and spends much
of the day lying on a sofa-and her attorney is "a man of strong and
fixed opinions, settled convictions, and great strength of mind and will
power." But, in such cases, it is useful to have as additional facts that
the attorney never sought to obtain any advantage for himself and was
not a beneficiary under the disputed trust, although he did serve as
trustee for 25,000 dollars plus commissions.
48
The necessary proof of fair dealing may be established by the un-
corroborated (and contradicted) testimony of the attorney himself.
If the trial judge accepts the attorney's evidence, the finding will ordi-
narily not be disturbed on appeal.
Whether the uncorroborated testimony of the respondent [attorney]
under such circumstances is that substantial evidence required by
law to support a-finding was a question addressed to the trial judge.
However controversial the question of the propriety of such a con-
clusion might be in this or any other similar situation attending a
trial, it is well settled that such a conclusion cannot be disturbed on
appeal.... It must of course be assumed that the trial court gave
to the evidence that close scrutiny required in cases involving a trans-
action between an attorney and his client.49
48 President, Etc., of Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 F. 480 (N.D. Cal. 1896)."...
if Judge Stanley could have imagined the difficulties, troubles, and annoyances, and at-
tacks upon his character, he might have demanded a higher fee." 75 F. at 508. See
also In re Phillipi's Estate, 76 Cal. App. 2d 100, 172 P.2d 377 (1946).
49 Hawkins v. Faries, 49 Cal. App. 2d 186, 193-94, 121 P.2d 20, 24 (1942). Cf.
Johnson v. Cogwill, 262 F. 306 (9th Cir. 1920). It was proper for the trial court to dismiss
plaintiff cestui's complaint alleging that an attorney and a trustee wrongfully divided
certain fees. After hearing the witnesses, the court could hold there was no substantial
direct evidence to support the complaint, despite testimony that the attorney admitted the
fee-splitting to a witness. "A contrary conclusion could be founded only upon the view
that the elder Denson [the attorney, since deceased] had willfully committed perjury in
his deposition, that Cowgill [the trustee] had also deliberately perjured himself, and that
the two had combined in a wicked purpose to deceive Johnson and to enrich Cowgill, the
trustee of the Johnson trust. It would also have to be founded upon the premise that Den-
son, a lawyer of presumably good character, had wrongfully concealed from his associates
all knowledge of a matter in which they were deeply interested, morally as well as finan-
cially, and concerning which he should have informed them." 262 F. at 314.
For other cases that involve "fair" dealings, see: Smallpage v. Winafred Orchards
Co., 154 Cal. App. 2d 676, 316 P.2d 751 (1957) (in which the appellate court refused to
disturb the trial court's finding, based on substantial evidence, that the attorney sufficiently
overcame the presumption of undue influence and insufficient consideration); Marlenee v.
Brown, 21 Cal. 2d 668, 134 P.2d 770 (1943) (in which the presumption of undue influ-
ence was rebutted because the client was thoroughly conversant with "every move" made
by her attorney and fully agreed on the method used in conveying title through the attor-
ney to a third party); American Box & Drum Co. v. Harron, 44 Cal. App. 2d 370, 112
P.2d 332 (1941) (in which the attorney withdrew from employment with both the plain-
Aug., 1961] THE ATTORNEY AS DEFENDANT
Purchase of Claim Held Against Client
When an attorney, dealing with a third party, buys a claim against
his client for less than its face value, he cannot use this transaction to
make a profit from his client.50 If, for example, he purchases his cli-
ent's promissory notes at a discount, the client has a right to buy the
notes from him at the lower price. Because he has breached a fidu-
ciary duty, the attorney becomes an involuntary trustee who must
assign the notes to his client on tender and payment of the considera-
tion that the attorney had paid out. 51
This restriction does not apply when a client, in full knowledge of
the facts, delays unreasonably before she asserts her rights against an
attorney who acted in good faith, but in his own interest. The attorney
can keep property he bought at a sheriff's sale, even though the land
had been his client's, if he informs her in detail of what he had done
and why, asks for (but does not receive) her consent to his acquiring
the property in the event she could not redeem it, and repeatedly
warns her she would lose all her rights unless she redeemed before a
certain date. Had the client acted promptly, she could have taken
advantage of her attorney's purchase, subject only to reimbursing him
for his outlay and for the reasonable value of his services. By failing
to do so, she is estopped from questioning the attorney's conduct, de-
spite his committing the technical sin of acting without her express
consent.
52
Money Had and Received
Duties of the Attorney
At various times in an attorney-client relationship the attorney
handles money rightfully belonging to the client. When the attorney
tiff company and the executor of the company president's estate, but failed to give full
data about a pending claim between the two); Boulton v. Stuart, 52 Cal. App. 484, 199
Pac. 71 (1921) (in which the principle was re-affirmed that the attorney has the burden
of proving fairness and adequate consideration); Cousins v. Partridge, 79 Cal. 224, 21 Pac.
745 (1889) (in which the attorney could recover on his client's promissory note by show-
ing the making of the note and the consideration.
50 Sutliff v. Clunie, 4 Cal. Unrep. 697, 37 Pac. 224 (1894).
51 See Martin v. Hood, 203 Cal. 351, 264 Pac. 478 (1928) (dictum); Andrews v.
Wilbur, 5 Cal. Unrep. 144, 41 Pac. 790 (1895). See also McArthur v. Goodwin, 173 Cal.
499, 160 Pac. 679 (1916). An attorney at law is forbidden to purchase an interest adverse
to his client in a thing in controversy. If he does so, as by purchasing tax titles to the cli-
ent's property without the client's knowledge, his fraudulent actions make him an invol-
untary trustee without any interest in the property. And see In re Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
52 Tomblin v. Hill, 206 Cal. 689, 275 Pac. 941 (1929). Apparantly the attorney was
trying to protect himself from a complete loss in a claim for compensation, and to protect
a third person who had loaned the client money on the attorney's representation.
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functions primarily as a business advisor, he often obtains money di-
rectly from his client to use in commercial activities that are sometimes
specified by the client and sometimes chosen through the lawyer's
own discretion. When litigation is at issue, the attorney frequently
serves as the intermediary who collects funds that a third person owes
to the client. In either circumstance, the attorney must be able to
render an accurate account of the funds he received and expended.
He must satisfy not only the fact of fairness, but the appearance of
fairness as well. Should he fail to give a proper accounting, he makes
himself vulnerable to the equitable action of money had and received,
which borders on the tort action of conversion.
The general rule is clear. In receiving money on his client's behalf,
the attorney takes the funds as a fiduciary and must account for what-
ever he receives. 53 He must answer for secret profits,54 for buying
claims that a third person held against the client,55 and for accepting
property which he had no authority to accept as full payment of a
third person's debt to the client.5 6
His conduct must bear up under the closest scrutiny, especially
when his clients are women without business experience, who are so
largely influenced by his advice. If a woman client has given him
money whenever he requested her to do so, she can retrieve the entire
amount unless he produces records showing how he disposed of these
sums or presents a written agreement specifying his fees.5 7 Even when
he claims that he made expenditures in carrying on her business activ-
ities and is therefore entitled to retain at least that amount, he must
still return all the money she had entrusted to him if he failed to show
vouchers for these alleged expenses. 58 He is also liable in this action
under facts which reveal that, after being hired to recover money
claimed by the client, he received a check made out to her name, per-
suaded her to endorse it without looking at the amount written on its
face, and took the money into his own possession from the teller's
counter at the bank. Though he later gave her an amount from which
53 McRaven v. Dameron, 82 Cal. 57, 23 Pac. 33 (1889). But see Bacon v. Bacon, 32
Cal. 2d 131, 194 P.2d 697 (1947). An attorney properly hired by the trustee of oil devel-
opment lands need not render a special accounting to the landowners when the owners
object to the attorney's retaining a percentage of the oil royalties. Since the trustee had
the requisite hiring authority, the attorney had a right to retain the money he earned as
reasonable compensation for his services.
54 Bruntsch v. Sales, 74 Cal. App. 310, 240 Pac. 43 (1925).
55 Cox v. Delmas, 99 Cal. 104, 33 Pac. 836 (1893). See also Martin v. Hood, 203
Cal. 351, 264 Pac. 478 (1928).
56 Horn v. Hamilton, 89 Cal. 276, 26 Pac. 833 (1891).
57 Rieck v. Chapman, 83 Cal. App. 735, 257 Pac. 168 (1927). See also Zeller v.
Knapp, 115 Cal. App. 486, 1 P.2d 1071 (1931).
5s Newman v. Newby, 64 Cal. App. 279, 221 Pac. 386 (1923).
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his fee had been subtracted, along with a receipt in full for his services,
he never informed her of the full amount of the recovery or the cost
of his services. These dealings constitute a breach of his fiduciary
obligation.59
The attorney who disregards his duties by refusing to account for
the funds of ignorant, credulous, or impecunious clients shows such
an absence of fair dealing that he is properly disbarred in the public
interest.60
Duties of the Client
A client, however, also has some obligations towards the attorney.
Courts recognize the unspoken fact that a lawyer, as a businessman,
commonly has an economic interest in the money he handles for his
client, primarily where a contingent fee arrangement exists. There-
fore, the attorney who satisfactorily performs a contract calling for
reasonable compensation may retain a reasonable sum from the amount
he collects for his client, while turning the balance over to the client.
Until it is legally ascertained that the attorney kept an unreasonable
amount in relation to his services, there are no grounds on which to
sue him for conversion of the retained money.6
The client with a grievance must respect the statute of limitations.
If he simply alleges that he was never informed of how much money
his attorney had collected for him, but does not directly allege fraud,
the client's conduct amounts to gross negligence. His failure to dis-
cover the attorney's wrongdoing, if any, falls within the statutory bar
since the client should have pressed for information at an earlier time.
"Natural curiosity, as well as business prudence, would have compelled
him to make the inquiry, and his failure to make it was inexcusable
negligence. . . . Such inquiry is entirely consistent with the utmost
confidence in the attorney."62
Rights of Third Parties
The money an attorney has retained may actually belong to a third
party, who can recover this amount after satisfactory proof. If, how-
ever, an attorney has collected money from a third party under a
judgment and execution that was later set aside, the attorney is liable
only for the money that was in his hands at the time the appellate
court reversed the earlier judgment.6"
59 Black v. Riley, 20 Cal. App. 199, 128 Pac. 764 (1912).
60 Bruns v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 2d 667, 117 P.2d 327 (1941).
61 Pullin v. Allen, 37 Cal. App. 218, 173 Pac. 772 (1918).
62 Simpson v. Dalziel, 135 Cal. 599, 603, 67 Pac. 1080, 1082 (1902).
63 Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal. App. 532, 261 Pac. 732 (1927). Presumably the earlier
judgment and execution were valid on their face.
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In unusual situations, money, ordinarily the most negotiable of
instruments, carries with it such defects in title that the action for
money had and received becomes proper. When an attorney, for
example, accepts money from an accused thief as his fee for defending
her and is informed by a sheriff that there is a "hold" order on her
funds because of the theft, the attorney takes the money with knowl-
edge of its infirmities. He is liable to the true owner, a stranger, for
the money he receives after so strong a warning about his client's ten-
uous claim to ownership. 64
Interpreting the Employment Contract
Applicability of Ordinary Contract Rules
Assuming that an employment contract between an attorney and
a client is made without any defects arising from a fiduciary relation-
ship, the agreement is still subject to ordinary contract rules. The at-
torney must receive consideration for his services before he becomes
obligated to perform them; 5 the client cannot make the attorney bring
legal proceedings against a third party until the client has perfected
his rights against that party;(6 the attorney is entitled to reasonable
notice that his client has new work to be performed;67 and the attorney
cannot be summarily ordered to refund a retainer fee because a judge
believes it has not been earned.6s For legal cause, either party can
6 Stiller v. Rogers, 69 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 805, 159 P.2d 457 (1948). Compare this
misadventure with the well-circulated story about Clarence Darrow and the fee he once
named as his price for defending an accused thief. The accused, on learning the high cost
of his possible freedom, quickly left Darrow's office. Within a short time he returned,
breathless, and handed Darrow the required sum in cash. Darrow rejected it. "I never
accept money that's been stolen," he declared, paused, and added, ". .. so recently."
65 Cavillaud v. Yale, 3 Cal. 108, 58 Am. Dec. 388 (1853). A demurrer is good
against a client's complaint that the attorney abandoned an appeal if the client does not
allege payment of the attorney's fees. An attorney is always entitled to his retaining fee
in advance unless he agrees otherwise, and payment must be pleaded as distinctly as any
other condition precedent.
66 Bayly v. Lee, 174 Cal. 137, 163 Pac. 96 (1916). If the client has not made
tender or payment to a third person, the attorney cannot sue that person for breach of
contract. The attorney does not therefore breach his own contract by a failure to bring
suit prematurely.
67Pelton v. Andrews, 24 Cal. App. 2d 124, 127, 74 P.2d 528, 530 (1937). When
a client hires an attorney to perform legal services "from time to time" in connection
with certain patents, but withholds information about one patent application until three
weeks before its deadline, this notice period is unreasonably short, especially if given
in July, "a time in which an attorney might be expected to be on vacation."
68Tomsky v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. 620, 623, 63 Pac. 1020, 1021 (1901). An
attorney cannot summarily be convicted of contempt for refusing to repay part of his
claimed fees to the guardian of an estate. "It is true he is an attorney of the court and
an officer thereof, but that does not deprive him of the equal protection of the law."
But cf. Cohen v. Hurley, 81 Sup. Ct. 954 (1961).
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avoid the contract by showing fraud, noncompliance with the con-
tract terms, or failure of consideration.69 On the client's death, the
relationship is automatically terminated unless there is a special em-
ployment contract such as a specific agreement to conduct a suit to
final judgment or to pay a set fee for the entire case 7
Uncertainty and Ambiguity
Some factors in a contract dispute are deliberately weighted against
the attorney. Since he is presumably familiar with legal terms and
proceedings and accustomed to use appropriate language in framing
contracts, while his client usually has no special knowledge on these
subjects, an uncertain and ambiguous contract is construed most
strongly against the attorney.7 1 If, for example, an agreement for at-
torney's fees uses the word "security" to describe the very property
established as the fee, the contract may be treated as a mortgage, to
satisfy the client's understanding, rather than as an outright convey-
ance, as the attorney has urged.72
When the contract is fairly and reasonably susceptible of two con-
structions, the attorney must inform the client of this susceptibility.
Before he proceeds further in performing the agreement, he must point
out the contract's ambiguity and definitely and clearly obtain his cli-
ent's views on the subject.7 3 An attorney should not litigate a matter
after he and his client had both assumed a trial would be avoided
unless, as soon as he discovers the matter requires litigation, he notifies
the client and either rescinds the contract or demands some different
fee arrangement.7 4 The attorney may not proceed with a case as though
the contract is still in force, with a mental reservation that he can
repudiate or rescind it after the trial,7 5 nor may he remain silent about
any charge outside the contract until the litigation has ended.76 If he
fails to notify his client about these unforeseen events, he is bound by
the original compensation agreement. Although the result may be
unfortunate for the attorney, "we cannot for this reason relieve him.
It is his business, in the course of his professional life, to often assist
69 Brydonjack v. Rieck, 5 Cal. App. 2d 219, 42 P.2d 336 (1935).
70 Estate of Mallory, 99 Cal. App. 96, 278 Pac. 488 (1929).
71 Bennett v. Potter, 180 Cal. 736, 183 Pac. 156 (1919); Bartlett v. Pacific Nat.
Bank, 110 Cal. App. 2d 683, 244 P.2d 91 (1952).
72 McClintock v. Bathurst, 23 Cal. App. 2d 647, 73 P.2d 1237 (1937). But see
Munfrey v. Cleary, 75 Cal. App. 2d 779, 171 P.2d 750 (1946).
73 Reynolds v. Sorosis Fruit Co., 133 Cal. 625, 66 Pac. 621 (1901).
74 Lavenson v. Wise, 131 Cal. 369, 63 Pac. 622 (1901). An attorney obtains knowl-
edge that a suit will be litigated when he is served with an answer setting up defenses.
75 Id.
76 Reynolds v. Sorosis Fruit Co., 133 Cal. 625, 66 Pac. 21 (1901).
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in compelling other parties to abide by their contracts. He must abide
by his."77
In the absence of a special agreement, however, a client is bound
to repay his attorney for all outlays made by the attorney to pay the
expenses of carrying on the litigation. The attorney must bear his own
personal and travelling expenses.
73
Rights and Duties After Judgment
Under a fair construction of the usual employment agreement, the
attorney cannot rest when he obtains a judgment for his client, but
must secure its satisfaction or execution before becoming entitled to
compensation for his professional services. If he obtains a judgment
without securing its satisfaction, his conduct amounts to an abandon-
ment of the agreement before its terms have been fulfilled. He may
also commit abandonment by settling with the judgment debtors for
an amount less than that called for in the judgment, unless he has re-
ceived his client's consent.70 Through a similar rule, but from a dif-
ferent point of view, a client cannot compromise and settle a judgment
to the exclusion of his attorney's rights if the client had given the attor-
ney an interest in the judgment. 0
Effect of Discharging the Attorney
The attorney performing under a contingent fee arrangement, based
on winning a particular case, does not have a lien on the judgment.
Whenever the client lacks confidence in the attorney's integrity, judg-
ment, or capacity, the client has an absolute right to discharge his law-
yer. The attorney's compensation is then based either on the express
agreement or on the reasonable value of his services. 8' As a rule, the
attorney can recover under the contract terms if he is discharged with-
out legal cause,82 but can claim compensation for only the reasonable
value of his services when the client fires him for good reason.83 Mis-
informing and misdirecting a client in a way that would defeat the
7 Id. at 630, 66 Pac. at 21.
78 Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 156 Cal. 510, 105 Pac. 981 (1909).
7'Hille v. Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 273, 259 Pac. 341 (1927).
80 McGown v. Dalzell, 72 Cal. App. 197, 236 Pac. 941 (1925). Unless the client
transfers this interest to the attorney, the attorney receives no lien on the judgment from
the mere fact that he has a contingent fee contract providing for payment of his legal
services in the action.
81 Gage v. Atwater, 136 Cal. 170, 68 Pac. 581 (1902).
82 Zurich G.A. & L. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 81 P.2d 913 (1938);
Countryman v. California Trona Co., 35 Cal. App. 728, 170 Pac. 1069 (1917).
83 Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 124 P.2d 21 (1942); Moser v. Western
Harness Racing Assn., 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1948). See also Kruger Estate,
130 Cal. 621, 63 P. 31 (1900).
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client's expressed desires is legal cause for discharge.84 So, too, is the
giving of "unsound" advice on a simple matter about which the facts
are clear and the authorities are in agreement.8"
But an attorney has not committed professional misconduct to the
point of justifying his discharge if the client complains that the attorney
joked about her inquiry on the specific questions she would be asked
at a deposition hearing, and simply complimented her on her ability
to "take care of herself"; that he made a facetious remark about a pos-
sible divorce suit between the client and her husband; that he suggested
that she "go out and dig up all the dirt" she could about her opponent
in pending litigation (although the attorney denied this); and that he
insisted she abide by their written agreement and produce sufficient
cash for a jury trial, even though she asked to be tried by the court
alone. These incidents are "not uncommon to the practice of nearly
every lawyer of extensive trial experience," and cannot be used to
deprive the attorney of his contract rights.86
Prohibited Contracts
Because the Rules of Professional Conduct impose special restric-
tions on an attorney's business and professional activities, courts must
sometimes decide how to act when an attorney enters into an agree-
ment that violates the Rules. In the ordinary case involving a tainted
contract, where both parties are found equally guilty, the court denies
its resources to the disputing parties and leaves them to their own
devices. The attorney, however, is peculiarly affected by his profes-
sional obligations. When he violates the Rules of Professional Conduct,
as by agreeing to split fees with an investigator, he cannot defend him-
self in a suit asking compensation for the investigatory work by plead-
ing the contract's illegality. The parties are not in pari delicto, since
the Rules prohibit only the attorney and not the layman from certain
activities. To permit the attorney to retain the money he promised to
pay would put a premium on the attorney's disregard of the rules made
for his guidance and conduct.
87
Need for Clearly Ascertainable Damages
A client suing an attorney for breach of contract must allege and
prove damages that are clearly ascertainable in their nature and their
origin.88 If the client alleges that her attorney, after being hired,
84 Salopek v. Schoemnann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 124 P.2d 21 (1942).
85 Moser v. Western Harness Racing Assn., 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1948).
86 Zurich G.A. & L. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 81 P.2d 913 (1859).
87 Cain v. Burns, 131 Cal. App. 2d 439, 280 P.2d 288 (1955).
88 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3301.
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wrongfully withdrew from one lawsuit and one bankruptcy proceeding,
as a result of which she suffered damages through being deprived of
his "superior skill and ability," her complaint is properly demurrable.
She cannot maintain an action on the ground that the results in her
other litigation would have been different under a particular attorney's
management.8 9 The court, though it must realize that some lawyers
are better than others, justifies its position by stating: 90
There are no means whereby such question can be determined. Ob-
servation teaches us the result of a trial cannot be predicted with
any degree of certainty, even though conducted by lawyers possess-
ing the marked skill and ability attributed under oath, upon informa-
tion and belief, to defendant.
Disqualification Because of
Prior Representation 9
In their determination to keep the attorney-client relationship free
of abuse, courts forbid an attorney from nullifying his fiduciary duties
even after he and his client have severed their association. The relation
carries with it a continuing obligation of fidelity and loyalty which dis-
qualifies the attorney from rendering professional services in the same
cause to his client's opponent or from later taking a position hostile to
his original client and inimical to the very interest he originally
guarded.92 "ITIhe attorney's lips are forever sealed"93 against disclo-
sure of information gained through the confidential relationship.
Even if his own professional standing has been troubled because
his client dismissed him for handling litigation in an allegedly poor
manner, the attorney cannot justify himself by changing sides in the
dispute. Permitting him to do so would allow him to use confidential
knowledge in an improper way.94 The ban applies regardless of the
fact that he was formerly attorney for all parties in the present dispute,
and would now represent one against the other.95
Attorneys may search for novel ways to avoid this restriction, but
courts reject these tactics if they threaten the integrity of the earlier
89 Lane v. Storke, 10 Cal. App. 347, 101 Pac. 937 (1909). But would a demurrer
have been sustained if the complaint had alleged that the client was damaged in her
other actions because counsel were unavailable or because her new attorney lacked the
time to prepare the cases adequately?
90 Id. at 350, 101 Pac. at 938.
91 This matter usually arises on a motion before or during a trial in which the at-
torney's new client and alleged ex-cient are the real parties.
92 In re Boone, 83 F. 944 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
93Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564, 571, 15 P.2d 505, 508 (1932).
9 Ibid.
95 Ibid. See also Valentine v. Stewart, 15 Cal. 387 (1860).
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relationship. One attorney, for example, was disbarred for offering to
share information about his client's allegedly defective patent with an
opponent in pending litigation. To justify himself, the attorney intro-
duced a document, drawn by him and signed by his client, that
released the attorney from all the duties, burdens, obligations, and
privileges peculiar to the attorney-client relationship, including an
implied consent for the attorney to appear against him without re-
striction. The court held the attempted release void as being contrary
to public policy. "An attorney cannot use the knowledge acquired
confidentially from his client in trafficking with his client's interests."96
As an exception to these restrictions, an attorney may "with perfect
propriety" represent his client's adversary on matters with which he
had no previous connection. The adversity of a new client to an old
client is not, by itself, a bar to the attorney's new undertaking. The
proper test is whether the attorney will now be called upon to exercise
an interest inconsistent with his established duty. Inconsistency ap-
pears when the attorney's new position requires him to injuriously
affect the former client in a matter which once united them, or to use
against the former client information acquired through their past rela-
tionship of trust and confidence.
9 7
With these considerations in mind, courts have permitted attorneys
to appear as counsel, despite a party's complaint of "former represen-
tation," in the following instances:
The attorney for the administrator of an estate may serve as at-
torney for the person claiming title to the estate when the administrator
is not a proper party to the litigation and has no possible interest in
the outcome. (Dissent: If the administrator of an estate is a lawyer,
lie cannot bring suit in behalf of a claimant. Since the administrator's
attorney is "one" with him in contemplation of law, the attorney should
also be prohibited from bringing suit. ) 98
An attorney may appear as counsel against his former friend when
he had never been the complaining party's personal attorney, although
they had previously been business and social associates and the attor-
ney had represented certain companies and groups in which the friend
was interested.99
An attorney for a corporation may represent it in an action the
company brings against one of its officers, and may use information
received from the officer in connection with company matters. Cor-
porate counsel represent the corporation, its stockholders, and its
96 In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 953 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
9- Id.
98 McCabe v. Healy, 138 Cal. 81, 70 Pac. 1008 (1902).
99 DeLong v. Miller, 133 Cal. App. 2d 175, 283 P.2d 762 (1955).
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officers in their representative capacity, but do not personally repre-
sent the officers. "It would be a sorry state of affairs"100 if the cor-
poration, through its attorney, could not use information that an officer
was bound to disclose to the company.
These exceptions represent a collision of personal acquaintances
rather than a debasing of protected interests. The courts, though
strict to impose a ban when an attorney-client relationship has been
proven, wait for the relation to be shown before they disqualify an
attorney. Distant contact between one party and the opposing attor-
ney, a common enough occurrence, cannot be used to harass the at-
torney and his new client.
Relation of Opponents
And Creditors of Client
Occasionally, attorneys have to defend themselves against charges
brought by their client's opponents or by persons to whom the client
owes a duty. As a general rule, attorneys are not liable under these
circumstances for acts performed in the exercise of their proper func-
tion as attorneys, provided the acts are done in good faith and are
pertinent to the matter in question. Whether the attorney acted in
good faith is a matter for the trial court to determine. 1' 1 In a con-
spiracy suit, for example, where plaintiff's allegations tend to prove
an alleged concert of action between the attorney, his client, and
others, the attorney's status as attorney does not immunize him from
liability for torts he personally committed or for wrongs done through
the conspiracy he allegedly joined. 0 2 Similarly, if the attorney sends
a copyright infringement notice that injures the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff alleges the notice was sent with malice and purposely to
inflict injury on him, the attorney's involvement is judged in the light
of surrounding circumstances. 10 3 And if an attorney wrongfully levies
execution on property, thereby slandering the owner's title, he is liable
for damages. 0 4
But when the attorney for a winning party prepares findings in
accordance with the court's order for judgment, and omits alleged
facts that were rejected by the trial judge, he is not liable to the losing
party for these omissions. Answering a claim that the attorney "knew"
the findings of fact and conclusions of law were false and by filing
100 Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, 290, 301 P.2d 10, 14 (1956).
101 Warner v. Roadshow Attractions Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 35 (1942).
102 Greenwood v. Mooradian, 137 Cal. App. 2d 532, 290 P.2d 955 (1955).
1
0 3 Warner v. Roadshow Attractions Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 35 (1942).
104 Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal. 2d 537, 134 P.2d 217 (1943).
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them "allowed, cooperated, and have willfully and aggressively at-
tempted to divest Plaintiff herein of her property through fraud," the
court stated that the losing party "no doubt sincerely believes that this
decision was a gross miscarriage of justice... [yet] no attorney can be
held liable for omitting from findings facts which after a full hearing
the trial judge has concluded are not true."10 5
On miscellaneous matters, the attorney has also been protected:
If an attorney, after an "honest, industrious search of the author-
ities, upon facts stated to him by his client," advises bringing suit
against a third person, he is not liable to the third person for malicious
prosecution. Under the attorney's oath of office, he is not only "au-
thorized" but "obligated" to bring his client's claim before the court.
The fact that this honest position is later determined to be erroneous
does not impair the attorney's protection. 0 6
When an attorney has conducted himself with propriety and the
complainant is not his client, the complainant has no right to invoke
the court's extraordinary power of summary proceeding to compel the
attorney to pay back a fee taken from an estate in which the com-
plainant has a contingent interest.
10 7
After an attorney has purchased his insolvent client's sheriff's cer-
tificates of sale from the man who bought them at an execution sale,
a creditor of the client cannot raise a presumption of fraud from the
mere relation of attorney and client. Since the transaction was fair
between the attorney and his client, and since the attorney owed no
special duty to the client's creditors, the creditor cannot impress a
constructive trust against the property.'08
105 Rousseau v. O'Gara, 148 Cal. App. 2d 676, 677, 678, 307 P.2d 376, 378 (1957).
Note, however, that the court added, "We need not decide whether an attorney might
be held liable in damages for knowingly presenting false evidence in a case. The allega-
tions here fall far short of such a situation."
106 Murdock v. Gerth, 65 Cal. App. 2d 170, 179, 150 P.2d 489, 493 (1944).
107 Brunings v. Townsend, 139 Cal. 137, 72 Pac. 919 (1903).
108 Fisher v. McInerney, 137 Cal. 28, 69 Pac. 622, 92 Am. St. Rep. 68 (1902).
But of. Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. 350 (1873). See also Hedden v. Waldeck, 9 Cal. 2d
631, 638-39, 72 P.2d 114, 118 (1939). If attorneys are entitled to a reasonable fee
for their services and their client owns no other property than the land in dispute, the
attorneys, as compared with a creditor of the client, have a right to take the property as
their compensation. "[T]he transaction may not be declared fraudulent for the reason
that by deeding the property the client was rendered insolvent. . . . It is presumed that
the attorneys, in fixing their fees, acted honestly, and only asked of their client fees
which they considered reasonable." The creditor cannot have the transfer set aside as
being an attempt to prevent him from realizing on his subsequent judgment against the
client. No presumption of fraud arises because the attorney is the client's son-in-law.
When an attorney buys his client's property at a judicial sale, the law imputes to him
knowledge of defects in the legal proceedings that were taken under his direction. The
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Negligence in the Performance
Of Professional Duties
Prescribed Standards of Care and Skill
According to a popular complaint, "The only trouble with having
talent is that people expect you to use it." Phrased in a more judicial
context, courts oblige an individual to reasonably satisfy the require-
ments of a job for which he claims competence and which he willingly
sets out to perform. The attorney, by accepting employment, impliedly
agrees to use ordinary judgment, care, skill, and diligence in carrying
out the tasks he has undertaken. 0 9 If he fails in these respects, he is
likely to forfeit all claim for compensation and can also become liable
for any damage the client suffered from this neglect.11o
The lawyer can thus properly be classified with members of various
other professions who are considered to possess knowledge, skill or
even intelligence superior to that of an ordinary man and are, as a
consequence, held to a higher minimum standard of conduct:11
Justifying the attorney's liability is the fact that his client, when
pursuing a right against a third person, is bound by the attorney's
errors and omissions, and would often be left without a remedy unless
he could charge the attorney with avoidable fault."
2
Applied to actual events, these principles establish that, on proper
proof, an attorney is negligent for: giving faulty legal advice; 1 3 con-
protection which the law gives to a purchaser at judicial sales is not extended to his
client's attorney, who is presumed to be cognizant of all the proceedings.
109 National Savings Bank of D.C., 100 U.S. 195 (1880); Kruger Estate, 130 Cal.
621, 63 Pac. 31 (1900); Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872); Sprague v. Morgan, 185
Cal. App. 2d -, 8 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1960); Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487,
269 P.2d 78 (1954); Moser v. Western Harness Racing Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200
P.2d 7 (1948).
110 See National Savings Bank of D.C., 100 U.S. 195 (1880) for a general statement
of this proposition. See Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 124 P.2d 21 (1942) and
Moser v. Western Harness Racing Assn., 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1948) for de-
cisions on an attorney's right to compensation after he committed acts of negligence. See
Cambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872) for the statement that, despite the English rule
holding an attorney liable only for gross negligence or gross ignorance, the firmly estab-
lished American rule is that an attorney becomes liable to his client for failure to use
ordinary skill and care in the course of his professional employment.
-1x Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d -, -, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1961).
112 See, e.g., Wyoming Pac. Oil Co. v. Preston, 171 Cal. App. 2d 735, 341 P.2d
732 (1959), holding that an attorney's negligence is not necessarily a ground for setting
aside a third party's default judgment against the client. See also Frost v. Hanscome,
198 Cal. 550, 246 Pac. 53 (1926).
113 Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d -, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961); Modica v.
Crist, 129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 276 P.2d 614 (1954); Perkins v. West Coast Lumber Co.,
4 Cal. Unrep. 155, 33 Pac. 1118 (1893).
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ducting a trial in a defective manner;114 failing to observe the required
procedures for obtaining a new trial or perfecting an appeal;115 vio-
lating his associate counsel's rights in their relationship with the heirs
to an estate;1 16 submitting fatally defective findings (which, though
adopted by the trial judge, are still traceable to the attorney's error);'17
and disregarding his client's specific instructions to prosecute a suit
on an overdue note and mortgage (even though his delaying strategy
was employed to spend enough time so that the mortgagor would die
before trial and make recovery easier).18
Negligence, however, is only one of the facts that must be shown
to make the attorney's conduct actionable, especially where the client
is seeking damages rather than simply trying to defeat the attorney's
claim for compensation.
Elements Necessary to Establish Negligence
In Giving Legal Advice
As a general rule, when an attorney's disputed conduct involves
legal advice rather than courtroom performance, the client must prove
four things to establish actionable negligence. He must show that:
(1) An attorney-client relationship existed;1 19
(2) In connection with the relationship the attorney gave the cli-
ent certain advice;
(3) The client relied on this advice and, as a result, did things
he would not otherwise have done;
(4) As a direct and proximate result of this advice and the doing
of these acts, he was damaged and suffered a loss.'
20
114 Brock v. Fouchy, 76 Cal. App. 2d 363, 172 P.2d 945 (1946) (dictum).
11 Kruger Estate, 130 Cal. 621, 63 Pac. 31 (1900); Drais v. Hogan, 50 Cal. 121
(1875); Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872); Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d
487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954) (for a later related decision, see Pete v. Henderson, 155 Cal.
App. 2d 772, 318 P.2d 720 (1957).
116 Pierce v. Wagner, 134 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1943). By alleging facts that show
both negligence and the breach of an agreement to associate as counsel in an estate dis-
tribution case, plaintiff attorney has stated a good cause of action against defendant
attorney. A motion to dismiss should not be granted since the complaint alleges "the
failure to perform acts which in reason should have been performed by appellee as at-
torney" (at 960), and further alleges that damage resulted from this failure.
117 Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Cal. App. 677, 283 Pac. 871 (1929).
31l Lally v. Kuster, 177 Cal. 783, 171 Pac. 961 (1918); for a later related decision,
see Lally v. Kuster, 48 Cal. App. 355, 192 Pac. 78 (1920). An attorney is guilty of
negligence for ignoring his client's specific instructions and following his own course
when, as a result, a suit to foreclose a mortgage is dismissed for want of prosecution
and the statute of limitations has run on a suit for the debt.
119 But see text at notes 163-174 for a discussion of privity in bringing suit.
120 Modica v. Crist, 129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 276 P.2d 614 (1954); McGregor v.
Wright, 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d 624 (1931).
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To illustrate these principles in detail, a complaint is good against
a general demurrer when it alleges that:
121
(1) The plaintiff retained the defendant as an attorney to repre-
sent her in purchasing an interest in a restaurant business;
(2) He agreed to do so in a skillful and diligent manner;
(3) In connection with his duties he advised her it was unneces-
sary for her to comply with California Civil Code section 3440,
on the recording and publishing of certain sale notices, and
also unnecessary to escrow the purchase price;
(4) This advice was negligent and unskillful;
(5) She relied on this advice and in consequence failed to do
certain things:
(a) She did not prepare, publish, or record notice of the in-
tended sale;
22
(b) She did not escrow the purchase price for payment of
claims, if any were later found to exist;
(c) She did not otherwise comply with California Civil Code
section 3440;
(d) She paid 4,000 dollars directly to the seller on transfer of
the partnership interest;
(6) If it had not been for the attorney's negligence:
(a) She would have done the acts required of her by stat-
ute; 2
3
(b) She would not have paid 4,000 dollars to the seller;
(c) She would have learned, through compliance with the
statute, of the existence of outstanding creditors, and
would not have suffered the damages she later sustained;
(7) As a direct, proximate, and sole'124 result of the failure to com-
ply with California Civil Code section 3440, she suffered the
following damages:
121 See Modica v. Crist, 129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 276 P.2d 614 (1954).
122 Although courts accept the allegation that a client "did things she would not
otherwise have done," the phrase is semantically awkward when applied to an act that
was omitted. Here, the client did not file the required notice. She implies that she
would have filed it except for the attorney's negligent advice. In fact, she probably
knew nothing about the statutory requirement when she hired her attorney and would
have omitted the filing unless she had received other legal advice. No doubt the phrase
should be taken to mean that she "did things she would not have done under proper
legal guidance."
123 See preceding note.
'1
2 4
1n discussing other relevant cases, the court in Modica v. Crist, 129 Cal. App.
2d 144, 147, 276 P.2d 614, 616 (1954) noted: "We should not attach undue significance
to the words 'sole' and 'solely." The court declared there is no requirement that a
negligence complaint against an attorney allege that the loss was caused "solely" by
the attorney's negligence, nor must the complaint negative other probable causes for
the loss.
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(a) A 4,000 dollar initial payment to the seller for a half in-
terest in the restaurant business;
(b) The seller's outstanding debts of 1,148 dollars, fifty-one
cents at the date of the transfer, paid by the plaintiff in
an effort to salvage the business;
(c) Partnership debts of 2,592 dollars, fifty-one cents in-
curred after the transfer of the partnership interest, paid
by the plaintiff;
(8) If it had not been for the attorney's negligence, she would
have been apprised in time of the seller's outstanding in-
debtedness and would have avoided her losses by repudiating
the agreement of sale.
In finding this complaint good, the court in Modica v. Crist125 the
court distinguished and explained several earlier cases that the defend-
ants bad advanced as barriers to the client's cause of action. Under
the Modica interpretation, which analyzed the precedents fairly and
accurately, the adjudicated cases supported the client's rights: Lally
v. Kuster126 uses a "but for" clause (i.e., "but for" the attorney's neg-
ligence, the injury would not have occurred) to mean that the attor-
ney's negligence is actionable if it is "a" proximate cause of the injury,
and not necessarily the only cause; Martin v. Hood127 represents a case
in which the client could not recover because no damage has occurred;
McGregor v. Wright128 denies recovery under a real holding that
there was no causal connection between the allegedly erroneous
legal advice and the claimed injury, and that the asserted financial
loss had an uncertain and speculative quality to it; and Feldesman v.
McGovern129 stands for the proposition that failure to plead proximate
cause is a good ground for demurrer. The effect of Modica is to em-
phasize the fact that a negligent attorney should be treated like an
ordinary wrongdoer. When he violates prescribed standards of con-
duct, the attorney must not be given substantive or procedural advan-
tages over his fellow tortfeasors.
As guides to be used in measuring the quality of an attorney's ad-
vice, courts have considered whether his proposed course of action
would have defeated his client's specifically expressed wishes,130
whether the state of the law surrounding the controversial advice is
125 129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 276 P.2d 614 (1954).
126 177 Cal. 783, 171 Pac. 961 (1918).
127 203 Cal. 351, 264 Pac. 478 (1928).
128 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d 624 (1931) (in which a trustee sued because his
reliance on the attorney's advice allegedly cost him his position as trustee).
129 44 Cal. App. 2d 566, 112 P.2d 645 (1941) (in which a client sued because his
attorney had failed to file a petition in bankruptcy).
130 Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 124 P.2d 21 (1942), a contract action.
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clear and well established,131 and whether the legal authorities on the
particular point are readily available to the attorney.13
2
An attorney, for example, is properly dismissed as corporate coun-
sel if he states that a new corporation can shed its obligations to a
pre-incorporation subscriber by passing a resolution to that effect and
by striking the unwanted subscriber's name from the subscription list.
"[W]ith but slight research," said the court, "a wealth of authority on
the subject is readily available," including California Jurisprudence
(a "handy reference work"), many relevant court decisions, the case
law of other jurisdictions, the leading treatises on corporations, Amer-
ican Jurisprudence, Corpus Juris Secundum, and other works-all of
which would have shown the attorney that his advice was "unsound."
13 3
131 Moser v. Western Harness Racing Assn., 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1948),
a contract action.
132Id. See also Lucas v. Harem, 11 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1961), hearing granted May 3,
1961, by the California Supreme Court.
133 Moser v. Western Harness Racing Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 9, 200 P.2d 7, 11
(1948). See also Lucas v. Hamm, supra note 126. In Lucas, the attorney included this
clause in a will:
"This trust shall cease and terminate at 12 o'clock noon on a day five years after
the date upon which the order distributing the trust property to the trustee is made by
the court having jurisdiction over the probation of this will." (11 Cal. Rptr. at 728.)
Since this clause made the residual trust null and void, the court found the attorney
negligent for permitting it to appear, even when the injured parties lacked privity with
him. Referring to a 1938 district court of appeals decision which ruled that a similar
provision in a will violated the rules against perpetuities and suspension of the power of
alienation, the court held the attorney negligent for not having learned of this authority.
The district court of appeals decision, which will not be officially reported, reveals
how some courts view an attorney's professional obligations. Against a claim that no
actionable negligence was pleaded because the rules against perpetuities and the suspen-
sion of the power of alienation are difficult for the ordinary lawyer, the court stated:
"We agree the subject is difficult, but the law today has its specialties, and even as
the general practitioner in medicine must seek the aid of the specialist in his profession,
so the general practitioner in law, when faced with a problem beyond his capabilities
must turn to the expert in his profession to the end that his client is properly served....
All that the respondent Hamm had to do in the present case was to examine the deci-
sions of the courts of his own state and he would have had the answer to the problem
he now says is confused and uncertain." (11 Cal. Rptr. at 731.)
What this court assumes is that something in the particular clause would (or should)
have triggered a competent attorney into further research on the problems of perpetuities
and suspension of the power of alienation. Yet at least one other attorney (the present
author) would have found this clause innocent and would have not been propelled from
a reading of its language to an examination of the particular rules that regulate trusts.
Stated from a different point of view, the injured parties were likely to be hurt in this
manner by any number of well-meaning lawyers.
On balance, then, should we penalize a client (i.e., by penalizing his heirs) for an
attorney's innocent mistake, or penalize the attorney for lacking expertise in a specialized
legal area which appears, on its face, to be within his competence? Probably, if the legal
profession is to command respect for its integrity, the attorney should find the means of
protecting himself, perhaps by malpractice insurance. His clients are in a poor position
to protect their interests from an attorneys innocent fault.
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Perhaps the most meaningful philosophy used in setting standards
for attorneys, however, is an unspoken implication from a case penal-
izing a non-lawyer for drawing a faulty will.1 34 After deciding the
privity question against him (and permitting an injured beneficiary
to sue135), the court stated that the defendant, a notary public, was
not qualified to undertake the legal tasks he had assumed for himself.
"His conduct was not only negligent but was also highly improper"131
and should be discouraged. But why discourage laymen from prac-
ticing law? Unquestionably, though not expressly declared by the
court, because the public can be protected from incompetent legal aid
only when its members consult licensed attorneys for these services.
Lawyers, under this premise, can be trusted to do the job they are sup-
posed to do. Unless attorneys accept this responsibility and offer resti-
tution for their mistakes, what theory justifies their having exclusive
rights to practice law in our society?
In Connection With Litigation
Despite an attorney's best efforts in presenting a case he deserves
to win, the court or the jury may render a verdict against him. 37 The
loss alone is not actionable, but the attorney can be held liable for
committing certain acts or making certain omissions that caused the
loss, if ordinary skill and care would have avoided that result. How-
ever, a claim that an attorney was negligent in prosecuting or defend-
ing a lawsuit must be accompanied by proof that careful management
of the client's suit would have resulted in recovery and collection of a
favorable judgment or, in the case of a defense, that proper handling
would have resulted in a judgment for the client.138
The client must show that he put the attorney in full possession of
the facts which supported his position, that the facts existed, and that
they were susceptible of proof at the trial by the exercise of proper
diligence on the attorney's part. 39 To support his claim that the at-
torney was negligent in failing to perform some necessary act, the
client must specify what the act was and must prove that if the attor-
ney had performed it, the client would have benefited. 14 0 Not only
134 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
135 See text at notes 163-174.
136 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 651, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
137 Cf. the popular story of the attorney who, after winning his first lawsuit, wired
his client, "Justice has triumphed." He received a one-word reply. "Appeal."
138 See Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1960).
139 Hastings v. Halleck, 13 Cal. 203, 2 Lab. 218 (1859).
1-0 Feldsman v. McGovern, 44 Cal. App. 2d 566, 112 P.2d 645 (1941). If the client
fails to allege that he was entitled to a petition in bankruptcy or that the petition would
have been granted on proper application, a demurrer is appropriate against a complaint
charging the attorney with negligence for failing to file the petition. Although bankruptcy
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does the client bear these burdens, but he must establish that he was
damaged by the attorney's conduct.' 41 To the extent that he does
not minimize these damages when the opportunity exists, the client's
recovery is accordingly reduced.
142
Proving that he suffered a real injury from the attorney's conduct
is often the client's most difficult task. He must virtually re-litigate a
case that has already been decided against him and show that the
earlier judgment was an erroneous result caused by his attorney's
negligence. This "rehearing" is not, however, a collateral attack on
the judgment, since the winning party in that suit is not affected by
the client's present action against his attorney. In reversing a trial
judge who refused to accept proof about the propriety of another trial
judge's final judgment, an appellate court has clarified the purpose of
the second suit:'
43
Such proof would not constitute a collateral attack on the judgment.
The judgment in the first action, as between the parties to that action,
is final. The purpose of the present action is not to reverse that judg-
ment. It has been finally determined that the judgment creditor in
the first action is entitled to that money. The appellant is not trying
to gain recoupment from that judgment creditor. He is seeking to
recover damages from his attorney, who was not a party to the first
action, for his negligence in permitting the judgment to become final
without taking an appeal. If he can prove-that the judgment in that
case was erroneous and would have been reversed, he should be per-
mitted to do so. In that event he has proved damage proximately
caused by the negligence. If this were not the rule, attorneys would
be placed in a special class, in that they, unlike other persons, would
be freed from liability for certain damages directly and proximately
caused by their negligence. There is no reason for placing them in
such a special class.
Given the opportunity to present proof of his injury, the client
nevertheless faces some complex legal problems. If, for example, an
attorney negligently failed to file a notice of a pending mortgage suit,
the client cannot maintain an action against him where no one acquired
any interest in the mortgaged premises during the pendency of the suit
is not a contested action, the client must allege that he meets the prescribed standards of
bankruptcy court before he can hold the attorney negligent in failing to obtain this relief.
141 Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1960).
142 Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d -, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961). A client's
failure to file a claim in bankruptcy as a general unsecured creditor of a third person
reduces the amount recoverable from an attorney because of the attorney's negligent fail-
ure to have a chattel mortgage acknowledged and recorded. (If the chattel mortgage had
been properly recorded, the client would have been secured for the full value of a loan
made to the third person. Under existing conditions, however, the client still could have
recovered some money from the third person through timely action. By failing to take this
action, the client cannot hold the attorney liable for this amount.)
'43 Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 490, 269 P.2d 78, 79-80 (1954).
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and the client purchased the property at the mortgage sale, paying
the full amount of his debt and costs. 144 Similarly, a nonsuit is proper
if an attorney negligently failed to levy execution against a third person
on the client's behalf, where the property in question belonged not to
the third person but to his wife. 145 An attorney is also safe from liability
where, after having conferred with a probate judge, he became con-
vinced that his clients had no rights to a share in an estate and, despite
a conflict of authority, the court later finds the attorney was correct. 46
But an attorney is liable for mismanaging a cause in trial court,
failing to perfect the record for a new trial, and failing to appeal an
adverse judgment when a third person's complaint against the client
was radically defective and wholly insufficient to support the judgment.
Since an appeal would have defeated that judgment, it is "inexcusable"
for the attorney to allow his client's rights to "become lost in the abor-
tive attempt to obtain a new trial" if a new trial was not necessary for
her protection. Furthermore, the defective order for a new trial was a
"positive damage" to the client because it "compelled her to incur
additional costs upon appeal taken from the order, and without any
reasonably well-grounded hope of success upon her part.'
' 47
One more fact to be considered in weighing the attorney's conduct
is the state of the law at the time of his allegedly negligent acts or
omissions. By common knowledge, the law changes, often suddenly,
often through an invisible dilution of supposedly indestructible rules.
These changes come about because an attorney insists on the validity
of his client's rights despite all contrary authority. Therefore, should
the accused attorney be judged only by the legal rules existing when
he took the action that was later protested as negligent? Or should
he be tried on the assumption that, by proper action, he could have
brought about changes for his client's benefit?
In a leading case nearly a century old (Gambert v. Hart148 ) , the
court held that the client suffered damage because later changes in
the law would have benefited him if his case had been properly
144 Hinckley v. Krug, 4 Cal. Unrep. 208, 34 Pac. 118 (1893).
145 Siddall v. Haight, 132 Cal. 320, 64 Pac. 410 (1901).
146 McMillan v. Greer, 85 Cal. App. 558, 259 Pac. 995 (1927) (semble).
14 Drais v. Hogan, 50 Cal. 121, 127, 128 (1875). See also Campbell v. Magana, 184
Cal. App. 2d 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1960). Even though defendant attorneys were negli-
gent in permitting the statute of limitations to run in plaintiff client's personal injury ac-
tion against a third person, the client cannot recover from the attorneys since she suffered
no damage. On the facts before the court she lacked a good cause of action against the
third person. Note, however, that the settlement value of her lawsuit, as distinguished
from its recovery value, had been eliminated from the case. Would her attorneys have
been liable if their negligence had prevented her from obtaining a cash settlement in
exchange for a promise not to sue the third person?
148 44 Cal. 542 (1872).
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handled. On the facts, the attorney negligently filed a defective mo-
tion for a new trial in a controversy between the client and a third
person, as a result of which the client's case could not be considered
on its merits during an appeal. The attorney argued that his client
suffered no damage because under then-existing law the client would
still have been liable to the third person and would not have had the
judgment reversed on appeal. Between the time of the defective ap-
peal, however, and the client's present action against his attorney, the
California Supreme Court overruled the earlier cases that had made
the client's appeal theoretically useless. The court then declared, with
respect to the negligently handled case, that:-
4 9
If we had been at liberty to look into the merits of the case it may be
that it would not have been decided until after the decision of Hahn
v. Kelly, or, if decided before, the presumption is it would have been
decided in accordance with the principles announced in that case,
which was decided at the same term. The [trial] court, therefore,
erred in holding that the mistake or "blunder" of the defendant [at-
torney] could not have resulted in a damage to the plaintiff [client].
Even under this decision, however, it is inconceivable that the at-
torney would have been considered negligent if, after losing a properly-
conducted trial, he advised against taking an appeal. A hope of
changing the law must often be measured by the out-of-pocket ex-
penses necessarily risked in seeking that result, and by intangibles
that cannot be assessed in terms of negligence.
Where a doubtful or debatable point of law is involved, the attor-
ney is not liable for lacking knowledge about its true state. If, for
example, under a mistaken view of the workmen's compensation law,
an attorney lets the statute of limitations expire during the time he
represented the client, he may successfully defend himself against a
charge of negligence. The eventuality that a later court decision re-
moved the obscure point from its doubtful status 150
[D]oes not in our view affect the question of respondent's [i.e., the at-
torney's] negligence prior to its rendition. The fact that greater pru-
dence might have caused him to initiate what he believed to be a
futile petition cannot, in lieu of a showing that he should have known
it to be otherwise, now cause him to be subjected to a judgment of
malpractice.
Perhaps the balance between the interests of the attorney and the
client should be struck to assure the attorney's absolute compliance
with settled legal procedures (e.g., time for filing papers, types of
notice required, etc.) and to permit the attorney the widest possible
140 Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542, 551-52 (1872).
150 Sprague v. Morgan, 185 Cal. App. 2d -, 8 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1960).
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Just as members of other professions can show that a layman was
injured because he failed or refused to follow the professional's advice,
an attorney can raise the defense of contributory negligence against an
injured client. Undoubtedly a client should be considered negligent
for disregarding his attorney's specific instructions, especially since one
has already been held grossly negligent for the simple act of failing to
ask his attorney about the disposition of certain money the attorney
had collected. 151
But contributory negligence should have no place as a defense
against an obedient client who originally hired the attorney to help him
avoid the very acts which are now labelled negligent. In rejecting this
defense after a client had failed to ask his attorney about acknowledg-
ment or recording of a chattel mortgage, one court has stated:
152
Clearly the value of an attorney's services in connection with a trans-
action of this nature consists largely of his superior knowledge of
the necessary legal formalities which must be fulfilled in order for a
document to be valid in the eyes of the law. If laymen such as appel-
lants were already familiar with the requirements to be met in order
to attain the legal status of secured creditors, it would seem likely
that there would be a considerable decrease in the demand for the
attorney's services.
The layman should be penalized for ignorance of legal matters only
when he refuses proper help, and not when the attorney he hires fails
in his duties.
Statute of Limitations
When an attorney commits a negligent act that violates his employ-
ment contract, he is ordinarily subject to suit only within the time per-
mitted by the statute of limitations. Under California Code of Civil
Procedure sections 337 and 339, actions on contracts, obligations, or
liabilities must be instituted within four years if founded on an instru-
ment in writing, and within two years if based on an unwritten agree-
ment. Suits against attorneys for negligence in the management of an
action have been barred after two years from the time the negligence
151 See Simpson v. Dalziel, 135 Cal. 599, 67 Pac. 1080 (1902).
152 Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d -- , -- , 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1961).
See also Fiatarone v. Masterson, 180 Cal. App. 2d 305, 4 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1960). In this
case, with somewhat vague reasoning, the court held no prejudicial error was committed
by the giving of an erroneous instruction that required the client to prove his freedom
from contributory negligence.
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occurred, presumably because the employment contracts were oral.1 3
But the attorney is estopped from raising the statute of limitations
if a client fails to make inquiry about his statements because the client
reposed trust and confidence in him and relied on his representations.
54
Unquestionably, where the confidential relationship of attorney and
client exists, the client's failure to discover the facts constituting fraud
or misrepresentation may be excused. 155 And yet the appropriate stat-
ute of limitations may be asserted to bar a fraud action if fraud is
alleged indirectly at best, and if the client's failure to ask the attorney
about the disposition of certain money can be classified as "inexcusable
negligence" that runs counter to "natural curiosity" and "business pru-
dence." 56
Immediately after the attorney violates his employment contract
by committing a negligent act, the client may begin his action. Al-
though this early suit might result in only nominal damages, the client
can show proof of actual damages up to the date of the verdict.157 By
failing to bring prompt action, the client risks the inertia that often
matures into unconscionable delay. He can then be deprived of his
otherwise valid chance to recover damages. Among examples of in-
jured clients being denied remedies for failing to act within the pre-
scribed time are cases where:
(1) An attorney negligently failed to sue the endorser of a prom-
issory note in his client's behalf after the drawer proved insolvent.
Since the client's cause accrued within a reasonable time after the
note was received for collection or, at all events, after the attorney's
failure to collect money from the maker, the client had to bring suit
against his attorney within a statutory period that started to run as
soon as the cause of action accrued.' 5
(2) A client sought to toll the statute of limitations by charging
the attorney with concealing a fact that delayed discovery of the at-
torney's negligence until after the statute of limitations had expired.
But the attorney could not be held responsible for concealment when
the client had already known of the fact in question because, at an
earlier time, the attorney had so informed him. To suspend the run-
153 See DeGarmo v. Mayo, Inc., 4 Cal. App. 2d 604, 41 P.2d 366 (1935); Wheaton
v. Nolan, 3 Cal. App. 2d 401, 39 P.2d 457 (1934); Jensen v. Sprigg, 84 Cal. App. 519,
258 Pac. 683 (1927); Hays v. Ewing, 70 Cal. 127, 11 Pac. 602 (1886).
1
5 4 Strangman v. Arc-Saws, 123 Cal. App. 2d 620, 267 P.2d 395 (1954).
155 Jensen v. Sprigg, 84 Cal. App. 519, 258 Pac. 683 (1927) (dictum). See also
Kornbau v. Evans, 66 Cal. App. 2d 677, 152 P.2d 651 (1944) (on the creation of an oral
continuing trust).
156 Simpson v. Dalziel, 135 Cal. 599, 67 Pac. 1080 (1902).
157 See Wilcox v. Executors of Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830), quoted with
apparent approval in DeGarmo v. Mayo, Inc., 4 Cal. App. 2d 604, 41 P.2d 366 (1935).
158 Wilcox v. Executors of Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
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ning of the statute because of fraudulent concealment or misrepre-
sentation, the client must be actually ignorant of these facts.159
(3) An attorney failed to bring suit and attachment proceedings
on certain promissory notes, as a result of which other creditors ob-
tained liens on the property and deprived the client of his security.
Since the liens were public records, the client had "means of knowl-
edge" (which is equivalent to "knowledge" in law) concerning the
attorney's negligence. The statute of limitations begins to run (appar-
ently) from the time the client should have known he had a cause
of action. 160
Means and sources of knowledge of the alleged breach and injury
were at all times available to plaintiffs and ordinary diligence on
their part in consulting such means and sources would have furnished
them with all the information sufficient to discover the breach and
commence suit within the two year period.
(4) One partner of a law firm embezzled money from his client,
but the other partner, the present defendant, neither knew of the
embezzlement nor received any benefit from the embezzled money.
The client could have sued the innocent attorney only on principles of
agency, for money had and received, but could not sue him directly
for fraud. If the statute of limitations has run on the money had and
received count, the action is barred against the innocent partner.' 6 '
Negligence in the conduct of a trial gives rise to a cause of action
that accrues when the "injurious" judgment is entered. If the statutory
time has elapsed between entry of the judgment and the beginning
of a suit against the negligent attorney, the client loses his remedy,
even though the second action is brought within the statutory time
measured from the negligent attorney's motion for new trial or failure
to appeal. "The negligence if any occurred prior to the entry of the




The doctrine of privity is an attempt to scale down to manageable
proportions John Donne's assertion that, "No man is an Iland, intire
of itself; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine .. "
Taking the view that responsibility to mankind must be limited in
practical affairs, the privity theory frees a tortfeasor from liability
except to a limited class of injured persons. Without such a limitation,
159 Jensen v. Sprigg, 84 Cal. App. 519, 258 Pac. 683 (1927).
160 Wheaton v. Nolan, 3 Cal. App. 2d 401, 403, 39 P.2d 457 (1934).
161 Gibson v. Henly, 131 Cal. 6, 63 Pac. 61 (1900).
162 DeGarmo v. Mayo, Inc., 4 Cal. App. 2d 604, 606, 41 P.2d 366 (1935). See also
Hays v. Ewing, 70 Cal. 127, 11 Pac. 602 (1886).
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the ill-effects of man's negligence might lead to boundless actions and
litigious intricacies as each wrongful act is followed down the chain
of results to its final effect.163
The theory, in principle, still holds good, but has been greatly
liberalized since the nineteenth century. In many situations, modem
courts permit a person not in privity to recover damages for the neg-
ligent performance of a contract. Nevertheless, in the absence of
privity, liability has been denied if the injury to the person bringing
suit was not foreseeable, or if the potential advantage to the injured
person from performance of the contract was only a collateral consid-
eration for the parties to the original transaction. Whether a particular
defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter
of policy. Courts balance various factors, among which are the extent
to which the transaction was intended to affect the person bringing
suit, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that be
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the de-
fendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.6 4
The California doctrine of privity, as it affects attorneys, has its roots
in Buckley v. Gray, 65 a case that magnified its precedents and has
since been disapproved by the California Supreme Court. 66 In Buck-
ley, an attorney was negligent for excluding certain parties from a will
despite the testatrix' wishes and for using the plaintiff, the testatrix'
son, as a subscribing witness, as a result of which the devise to him
was rendered void. The court sustained a demurrer to the son's com-
plaint, holding that he lacked privity with the attorney and so could
not bring the action. According to Buckley, an attorney is liable for
negligence in the conduct of his professional duties to his client alone,
and not to third parties who were strangers to the contract for employ-
ment and services. Only when an attorney has been guilty of fraud,
collusion, or a malicious or tortious act is the privity requirement ig-
nored. The rule protecting beneficiaries of a third-party beneficiary
contract has no applicability to cases involving wills, since it applies
103 See Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895), disapproved in Biakanja
v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
164 See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). See also Pierce v.
Wagner, 134 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1943), in which defendant, who allegedly breached his
agreement as an associate counsel with plaintiff attorney, argued that -nly the client, who
was not a party, could recover for an attorney's negligence. Skirting the issue, the court
permitted plaintiff to bring an action on an estate matter because the complaint was not
solely founded on negligence but alleged the violation of a right arising from the associa-
tion agreement between plaintiff and defendant.
265 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895).
166 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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only to instances where the contract is made "expressly" for the benefit
of the third person. The rule does not apply where the third person is
merely incidental to the contract or remotely benefited from its terms.
Because plaintiff son had no vested right in his mother's will, which
remained purely ambulatory and could be changed at any time, he
had only a mere possibility of benefit, and not a right which could
make him privy to the contract. To bolster its conclusion, the Buckley
court stated: 167
... [Tihe rule is universal that for an injury arising from mere negli-
gence, however gross, there must exist between the party inflicting
the injury and the one injured some privity by contract or otherwise,
by reason of which the former owes some legal duty to the latter.
As an example of the "universal" rule that guided its decision, the
Buckley court cited the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Na-
tional Savings Bank of D.C. v. Ward. 68 What Buckley failed to note,
however, is that the highest court in the land had split six to three in
that case, with the Chief Justice and two Associate Justices dissenting.
National Savings Bank of D.C. v. Ward involved an attorney, the de-
fendant, who was hired by a landowner to prepare title certificates after
a title search on certain land. Because of his negligence, the attorney
prepared a defective certificate, which the landowner then used in se-
curing a loan from a bank, the plaintiff. Holding that the bank could not
recover from the attorney since the person occasioning the loss must
owe a duty, contractual or otherwise, to the person sustaining the loss,
the court noted that the bank had never retained or employed the at-
torney and had not paid him anything for making the title certificates.
Furthermore, the attorney never performed any service at the bank's
request or in its behalf, and did not know that the title certificates were
to be used to help the landowner get a loan from the bank. Finally,
neither fraud nor collusion was alleged.
Dissenting from this position, Chief Justice Waite declared:16 9
I think if a lawyer, employed to examine and certify to the recorded
title of real property, gives his client a certificate which he knows or
ought to know is to be used by the client in some business transaction
with another person as evidence of the fact certified to, he is liable
to such other person relying on his certificate for any loss resulting
from his failure to find on record a conveyance affecting the title,
which, by the use of ordinary professional care and skill, he might
have found.
After lying dormant for years, at least where attorneys' personal lia-
167 Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 342-43 (1895).
168100 U.S. (10 OTTO) 195 (1880).
169 Id. at 207.
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bility was concerned, these arguments about privity were re-animated
in recent litigation. The Buckley reasoning held firm to absolve a non-
lawyer from liability for negligently preparing an invalid will, where
the intended beneficiary sued because he was deprived of his expected
inheritance. Not having been a party to the original transaction, the
beneficiary could not bring suit against the defendant for carelessness




The following year the California Supreme Court, faced with an-
other suit involving a defective will prepared by a non-lawyer, de-
clared that an injured beneficiary did have standing to sue the person
who drew the will.17't As a result, the beneficiary recovered a judgment
for the difference between the amount she would have received if the
will had been valid and the amount actually distributed to her. To
reach its decision, the court "disapproved" conflicting statements in
Buckley v. Gray'7 2 and Mickel v. Murphy.173 When a person drawing
a will (here, a notary public) must have been aware from its terms
that faulty solemnization would cause the will to be invalid and make
the intended beneficiary suffer the very loss that did occur, that person
should not be protected by immunity from civil suit. If immunity
existed, the only person who suffered a loss would be denied a right
of action.'
7 4
Because Biakania v. Irving involved the negligence of a notary
public whose unauthorized practice of law violated the Business and
Professions Code, it may be argued that liability was imposed on him to
discourage non-accredited persons from practicing law, and that the
privity doctrine should be retained in favor of authorized practitioners.
To do so, however, would hold the layman to stricter accountability
for his legal efforts than the attorney. Assuming that such an argument
prevailed, a testator would advisedly consult a non-lawyer to draw his
will since his beneficiaries would obtain either a valid will or a good
cause of action against the person who drew it.
"10 Mickel v. Murphy, 147 Cal. App. 2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957). This case is com-
plicated by the fact that the defendant, a non-lawyer, may actually have been hired only
as a "scrivenor" of legal instruments, rather than as a person qualified to prepare a will.
37. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
172 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895).
'73 147 Cal. App. 2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957).
'74 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). See also Lucas v. Hamm,
11 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1961), hearing granted May 3, 1961, by the California Supreme
Court. The District Court of Appeals, in an opinion that will not be officially reported,
states (at 731) that, "in our opinion the Supreme Court established that lack of privity
of contract will no longer bar a suit by a designated beneficiary of a will to recover for
loss occasioned by an attorney's negligence in drawing the instrument. Rejection of the
privity doctrine in this type of case is particularly justified because no other person can
recover for the loss caused by the attorney's negligence."
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